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In this thesis, there are two linked research questions concerning the use of torture: Why the use of torture changed 
from a common legal practice to an act prohibited by international law, and why the United States, a modern, 
western state that advocates human rights, has used torture in the 21
st
 century despite this?  I have used sociological 
and legal approaches to analyse and answer these questions, utilising especially concepts developed by Foucault. I 
have chosen these approaches, since I will present torture as an inherently unequal act, which is connected to the 
power-structures of societies. I will concentrate on analysing this relation and the role of human rights in it. 
 
The use of torture has undergone a drastic change from being a common practice to an act strictly prohibited by 
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changes in the different ruling powers in the society – first, the decreased influence of sovereign power and 
dominance of disciplinary and governmental powers, and then the re-emergence of the sovereign power and its use 
of security discourses and mechanisms to regain its powers. Human rights have played part in both of these 
processes at the national level by being part of new forms of governing and also as a justification sovereign power, 
and also at the international level by being a restrictive element but also as a tool for the sovereign power.  
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Tutkimuskysymykseni tässä tutkielmassa ovat: Miksi kidutuksen käyttö on muuttunut oikeudellisesta käytännöstä 
kansainvälisen oikeuden vastaiseksi teoksi, ja miksi Yhdysvallat on käyttänyt kidutusta 2000-luvulla tästä 
huolimatta? Olen lähestynyt näitä kysymyksiä sosiologisesta ja oikeudellisesta näkökulmasta, koska kidutus on 
luonteeltaan epätasa-arvoista valta-asemaa heijastava teko, joka on yhteydessä yhteiskunnan valtarakenteisiin. 
Analyysissäni olen käyttänyt Foucault:n käsitteitä, ja keskittynyt erilaisiin valtasuhteisiin ja -rakenteisiin, sekä 
ihmisoikeuksien rooliin niissä. 
 
Kidutuksen käyttö on muuttunut historian aikana oikeudellisesta käytännöstä kansainvälisen oikeuden vastaiseksi 
teoksi, mutta sitä käytetään silti edelleen. Erilaiset yhteiskunnan valtasuhteiden muutokset – suvereenin vallan 
vähentyminen ja hallinnollisen ja kuripidollisen vallan vaikutuksen kasvu, ja uuden suvereenin vallan kasvu 
turvallisuumekanismien ja -diskurssien avulla voivat selittää näitä muutoksia. Ihmisoikeuksilla on ollut rooli näissä 
muutoksissa: ne voivat toimia kansallisella tasolla osana uusia hallinnollisia keinoja ja oikeutuksena suvereenille 
vallalle, sekä kansainvälisellä tasolla suvereenia valtaa rajoittavana normina, mutta toisaalta myös suvereenin 
vallan työkaluna. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In this thesis I will analyse the use of torture in Europe and the United States from 
medieval to modern times. The reason, why I chose this topic is that I was intrigued by the 
fundamental changes in the use of torture during history: In medieval era, torture was 
commonly practiced in Europe as a part of judicial processes, and its use diminished until 
it was fully abolished and it is considered currently as an act against norms of international 
law. Its use did not however completely stop, and it has resurfaced in the 20
th
 and 21
st
 
centuries, the most recent case being the torture practiced by the United States in its war on 
terror. These changes in the use of torture raised two questions:  Why the use of torture 
changed from a common legal practice to an act prohibited by international law, and why 
the United States, a modern, western state that advocates human rights, has used torture in 
the 21
st
 century despite this? The aim of this thesis is to analyse and provide an answer to 
both of these questions.  
 
In order to be able to better analyse the use and functions of torture in societies, I have 
decided to use two different approaches in this thesis. First I will use legal approach and 
introduce the historical changes in the use of torture as a part of judicial systems and 
present its position in modern international law as a part of human rights norms. This 
analysis will form the first part of my thesis. In the second part of this thesis, I will use the 
sociological approach in order to analyse these changes in the use of torture in relation to 
different power-relations in society and changes in the ways society was controlled and 
governed, paying particular attention to the role of human rights norms and discourses. 
 
The historical and territorial scope of thesis 
 
In this thesis I will first concentrate on the use of torture in medieval Europe, and in later 
chapters I will analyse, how the use of torture has re-emerged in the United States in the 
21
st
 century. There are several reasons for limiting the scope of my thesis to these places. 
One reason is that the ways in which torture is used in societies vary across the globe 
significantly. Torture is also often used unofficially, and it is hard to gain trustworthy 
knowledge of the use of torture if it is not reported. This is especially the case in 
authoritarian regimes or states in conflict situations, where the state control is often weak 
5 
 
and it cannot (or does not want to) prohibit the use of torture. Taking all these differences 
into account would enlarge the scope of the thesis too wide and would make any analysis 
and generalisation difficult.
 1
 
 
Another reason for concentrating on these states is that their use of torture during history 
has been researched and analysed in previous scholar writings,
2
 and even though there are 
several differences in the use of torture in these societies
3
, they form a rather homogenous 
group of societies, when comparing the world-view, moral values and ways of governing: 
all these states are, or have been, mainly Christian, ruled by monarchs and then 
experienced industrialisation and turn to nation-states and are nowadays democracies with 
rather similar value systems (Christian origins, belief in human rights with strong emphasis 
on individual freedoms, economic liberalism in various degrees and political democracy). 
Many human rights treaties, which prohibit torture, are also in place in most of the states in 
this area (for example the European Convention of Human Rights is very influential in 
developing human rights discourses and securing the implementation of rights in Europe). 
Many human rights treaties are also based on the western worldview, and thus their use as 
a starting point in the analysis of prohibition of torture is more useful in these cultures. 
Many sociological theories are also based on the Euro-American view of society, and work 
best when used to explain conditions and development of control in the above mentioned, 
post-industrial, Christian, urbanised and so –called “modern” or “post-modern” states. 
Another reason for choosing especially the United States as a particular point of interests, 
because its approach towards torture has drastically changed in the 21
st
 century in the war 
on terror: the United States is one of the advocates for western democracy and human 
rights, but at the same time, it has reportedly used torture in a systematic way in the 21
st
 
century.
4
  
 
I have chosen to concentrate on time period from medieval to modern times. I have done 
so since extending the scope further back in history would expand the thesis too much 
considering the page restrictions. Another reason for selecting this time period is that there 
                                                 
1
 More information about, where and how torture takes place, see e.g. Human Rights Watch –webpage 
(www.hrw.org). 
2
 See for example, Langbein 1977: Torture and the law of proof, University of Chigago Press, Chigago; 
Foucault 1995:discipline & punish, the birth of prison, vintage books, New York. 
3
 One notable exception is England, where judicial torture was not used in systematic manner in criminal 
legal processes even in medieval times. 
4
 Osiel 2009 2009: The End of Reciprocity, Terror, Torture and Law of War. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 390. 
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have also been significant changes in the use of torture during this time period: it was first 
commonly used as a part of judicial systems, then it became forbidden but its use never 
completely stopped and has resurfaced in the 21
st
 century.  
 
Approaches and methods used 
 
In this thesis I will concentrate on two different approaches towards torture. In the first part 
of this thesis I will concentrate on why the use of torture has changed as part of judicial 
systems and what is its position in modern world and international law by using legal 
approach. In this analysis I aim to illustrate, how the use of torture and the way torture is 
perceived has dramatically changed during the history from common legal practice to an 
act prohibited by international law. I will also look at the current position and definition of 
torture in international law and the latest emergence of the use of torture practised by the 
Unites States.  
 
In the second part of this thesis I will continue to analyse why the use of torture has 
undergone such changes by using sociological approach. By the sociological approach, I 
mean an approach that concentrates on the structures of society, and the relations between 
its members. By choosing this approach, I aim to analyse, how torture is used in societies 
as a mechanism of control, and what are its relations to sovereign and ways of governing 
people. I have chosen this approach, since torture, as it is defined in many international 
conventions, is closely linked to state power – torture is an act performed by someone in 
official capacity, and  is therefore characteristically an unequal act and a display of certain 
power-relations. Since sociological approach concentrates on the structures of society, and 
the relations between its members, it can be used to expose the underlying power-relations 
that are present in the use of torture, offering a complementary view for purely legal 
approach towards the use of torture. Sociological analysis is also useful when analysing the 
role of human rights in the use of torture. As can be seen from second of my research 
questions, torture is practiced even in states, that itself support and advocate the norms of 
human rights. In order to understand this conflict, I will use the sociological analysis also 
in order to see how human rights relate to powers and ways of control in the society, and 
how they can be used in both ways – as a legal norm to limit these powers and also as a 
tool to facilitate their functions. 
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In this analysis I will use mainly concepts of power and control inspired or developed by 
Michel Foucault. I have chosen to use Foucault, since he has analysed the use of torture in 
relation to state power, and his theories have functioned as a starting point for many other 
theories in the sociological scholar field
5
.  I will concentrate on the concepts of sovereign, 
disciplinary and governmental power, and aim to explain the changes in the use of torture 
by changes in the relations between these three different powers.   
 
 
Terms and definitions used 
 
The most important (and at the same time most difficult) definition in this thesis is the 
definition of torture. I will discuss the definition of torture in international law in the first 
part of this thesis, and in the second part, I will also discuss the nature of torture as a 
sociological phenomenon. Even though it is impossible to find one exhaustive definition of 
torture, in this thesis I will use loose definition of torture based on (but not limited to) 
different ways of defining torture in international law: I will define torture as an act of 
mental or physical violence, which has an aim, and the use of which is somehow linked to 
state power or authorities.  
 
In order to facilitate reading, I will use the term “the western world”, or “the West” in 
order to refer especially to Europe and United States. I will define the different 
sociological terms, which I will use in the analysis, in the second part of this thesis.  
 
 
The structure of thesis 
 
I will approach the notion of torture from two different aspects, which will form the 
structure for this thesis. I have divided the thesis in two parts: in the first part I will look at 
the use of torture from legal aspect. This part will aim to answer the research questions 
from legal perspective, concentrating especially on the emergence of the human rights 
norms. This part will also function as an introduction and background for the latter 
analysis. I will start the first part by introducing the short history of torture in Europe from 
                                                 
5
 See e.g. Foucault 1995; Lemke 2007: An indigestible meal? Foucault, governmentality and state theory. 
Distinktion:Skandinavian journal of social theory, 2007 no 15;  Munro 2003: On power and domination, 
Feminism and the final Foucault. European journal of political theory, 2:79. 
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medieval to modern times in the first section. In the second section I will look at the use of 
torture in the modern era, by first analysing the prohibition of torture in customary 
international law and in international conventions, and then presenting the use of torture by 
the United States in its war on terror. 
 
In the second part of the thesis I will approach the notion of torture and its use from 
sociological approach, and aim to provide further answers to the research questions 
concentrating on different powers present in the society and their relations to torture and 
the role of human rights in this. I will begin the second part of this thesis by first 
introducing the theoretical framework and the concepts based on Foucault, which I will use 
in the latter analysis. In sections two and three I aim to answer the first of the two 
questions posed in this thesis. I will start this in the section two by analysing reasons for 
torture in the medieval times, and discussing how torture can be seen to be a means for 
demonstrating and increasing sovereign power in the body of the subject due to unequal 
nature of the act of torture. In the third section I will continue by analysing the reasons for 
the decrease of torture from the early modern period. I will present the notions of 
disciplinary and governmental powers as part of the new forms of governing and 
controlling people and discuss their role in the decrease of torture. I will also analyse the 
role of human rights in this development by presenting them as a part of these new forms 
of governing and also as a justification for the sovereign power. Lastly, in the fourth 
section, I will turn to the second question and analyse the emergence of torture in the 
United States in the 21
st
 century, using the same notions of different powers described in 
previous chapters. I will also analyse the role of human rights in this latest development, 
and discuss how the human rights discourses are used in this processes in the international 
level. 
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PART 1 
 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF TORTURE 
 
  
10 
 
INTRODUCTION TO PART 1 
 
In the first part of the thesis I will aim to analyse and answer the two research questions I 
posed in the beginning of this thesis using a legal approach. I will do this by presenting a 
short history of torture in the West from medieval to modern times, and discussing its 
position in the current international law and part of human rights norms. This first part of 
the thesis will also function as an introduction and background for the second part of the 
thesis, where I will analyse these presented changes in the use of torture using sociological 
approach.  
 
The first part of the thesis is divided in two sections. In the first section, I will concentrate 
on the history of torture by discussing how torture has been used as a part of judicial 
processes in Europe. In the second section I will turn to analyse the position and use of 
torture in current times by first discussing how torture is prohibited and how its definition 
has evolved during the history in international law. In this section I will also present how 
torture has been used by the United States in its war on terror. 
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I A short history of torture 
 
In this section I will discuss torture from historical perspective. The use of torture has gone 
through a complete transformation in the West, from being a routinely practiced act and 
part of legal judicial system, to an act, which was perceived so wrongful, that it has 
become prohibited by international law. The aim of this section is to illustrate this process 
and act as a starting point for the latter analysis of the use of torture as a sociological 
phenomenon. I will first shortly present how torture has been an integral part of judicial 
processes in medieval Europe, and how its use diminished from the early modern times at 
the same time as the human rights discourse gained prominence. 
 
1. Torture in medieval Europe 
 
Torture is no novelty when it comes to trying whether a person has committed a crime or 
not – already in ancient times persons could be tortured in order to make them to admit 
their guilt
6
, and in some cases the confession achieved via torture was even seen more 
reliable than confession without torture.
7
 Torture was also used widely in continental 
Europe in the medieval times, first as a form of conducting ordeals and later in the judicial 
system of standard of proof. 
 
In this chapter, I will discuss both of these ways of using torture in turn. I will first present 
how torture was used in ordeals and later in systems of standard of proof. In the end of the 
chapter I will shortly summarise some reasons for why torture was not used in all societies 
on that period even in Europe. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 The torture has been used as a part of judicial process also in for example the ancient Greece, Ottoman 
Empire and in ancient and Rome. (Einolf 2007: The Fall and Rise of Torture: a Comparative and Historical 
Analysis. Published in Sociological Theory 25:5 June 2007, 107,108). 
7
 Einolf 2007,107. 
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1.1  From ordeals to standard of proof 
 
In medieval Europe the judicial process was organised by the use of ordeals up to the 13
th
 
century. The ordeals were public events, where the accused person was brought before 
justice and was made to go though some kind of a physical test to determine whether he or 
she was guilty or not. These tests could be for example drowning the person in the water 
and seeing if he or she floats (floating would indicate guilt on the persons behalf, since 
water was perceived as a holy element, which would reject sinful people), or burning him 
or her with a hot iron and seeing whether the wound would heal in a certain time. The logic 
behind these acts was closely connected to the Christian religion – in these events which 
could lead into either one of the consequences (chance was often around 50-50 for one 
consequence or the other taking place), God was asked to show the guilt of the person by 
making certain outcome appear.  
 
The system of ordeals became abolished officially in all of Europe by 1215 although some 
critique and diminishing use of ordeals was seen already some time before this. The 
critique towards ordeals came from different sources: one was the religious view, which 
held that God should not be bothered by the petty conflicts between individual people. 
There was also critique toward the effectiveness of the ordeals – as can be seen today, the 
probability of person being declared guilty had little to do with his actual guilt.
8
  
 
The original dilemma of how to determine one’s guilt did not, however, disappear. This led 
in continental Europe to the development of the legal system of standard of proof. In this 
system, in order to convict a person, either a testimony of two eyewitnesses or a confession 
(this was titled full proof) had to exist. Since appearance of two eyewitnesses was not often 
the case, some incentive needed to be created for persons to confess the crimes they had 
committed.  This is the point where torture became part of judicial process in medieval 
Europe. The system of torture was judicially regulated: in order for person to be tortured, a 
reasonable doubt had to be presented of the person’s guilt (for example one eyewitness or 
circumstantial evidence). The person could then be tortured until he or she would make a 
confession, and after this the accused had to repeat the confession in trial. If the accused 
would deny his or her guilt in court, he or she could still be taken back to be tortured once 
                                                 
8
 Pihlajamäki 2013: lectures on the European legal history. 
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more and then brought back to trial. If still after this the accused would not plead guilty, he 
or she must be let free – at least until further proof of one’s guilt would appear (there were 
also some cases, where the court could also describe punishment without confession or full 
proof, and these cases grew more frequent while the status and power of court systems 
grew stronger). 
9
  
 
The ways in which torture was used varied throughout time and in different societies, but 
there were also some common features. For example, in all systems that used torture, some 
reasonable doubt of one’s guilt before one could be tortured had to exist and torture was 
used only in cases of most serious crimes.
10
 Torture was often possible also only towards 
certain groups of people (for example, the higher social class could be considered to have 
immunity from torture).
11
 Torture had also several different forms. Most often it was used 
in order to gain confession before or during the trial, but it could also take place before the 
enactment of the punishment, after the verdict (“preliminary torture”).12 Most often the 
sole confession was not sufficient but the accused had to state some facts known only by a 
person that could be guilty, but this rule was not always applied in practice.
13
 The use of 
torture was not, however, practiced in all societies even in Europe, Great Britain being one 
remarkable example. Next, I introduce some reasons for this. 
 
1.2 Other legal systems 
 
Even if torture was common practice in continental Europe, there were also other legal 
systems, where torture did not appear, at least in as institutionalised form as in continental 
Europe. For example, the presented system of standard of proof never gained prominence 
in England. This is because in England, the common law system was already well 
developed before the continental system of standard of proof started to gain foothold in 
Europe. The common law system included a jury that consisted of local laymen, that would 
in the end determine whether the person was guilty or not. This procedure had been 
functioning rather well and there was thus no urgent need to modify the system. Other 
                                                 
9
 Pihlajamäki 2013; Einolf 2007, 107; Langbein 1977, 45-69. 
10
 Einolf 2007, 107,108. 
11
 Langbein 1977, 13. 
12
 Ibid., 16. 
13
 Ibid., 13-16. 
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reason why torture was not used in systematic manner as part of criminal procedure in 
England can be that the courts and legal processes were very local – the laymen were often 
collected from the local community where the crime had taken place or where the conflict 
had happened. Other exception where torture was not used was Scandinavia. For example 
in Sweden, oaths and eyewitnesses were used to show the guilt of a person. There existed 
also a system of comprogators (this meant that a group of persons (for example 6, 12 or 36) 
had to swear on the credibility of the accused). The continental system of standard of proof 
was used in Scandinavia later on, but as such it did not include the element of torture.
14
 
 
The use of torture decreased also in continental Europe already from the 16
th
 and 17
th
 
century onwards, and its use became banned in all of Europe in the 19
th
 century. In the next 
chapter I will turn to analyse this decrease. 
 
 
  
                                                 
14
 Pihlajamäki 2013; Langbein 1977, 73-88. 
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2. The decrease of torture from the early modern times  
 
Even though torture had gained rather customary procedural status in trials of the medieval 
times in continental Europe, its use started to decrease in the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries.  This 
trend continued and grew in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries resulting in official abolishment of 
torture in all European states by 1851. Even though the use of torture as a part of judicial 
process was banished, its use did not completely vanish, but actually increased again in the 
20
th
 century especially during wars and in fascist and communists states and states in 
internal conflicts
15
. Despite this increase, torture never gained again a legitimate position in 
the western societies and its use became more and more morally despised. This 
development continued in the modern era and the use of torture became eventually 
prohibited by norms of international law, at the same time as the human rights discourse 
gained prominence. In this chapter I will discuss the reasons for abandoning torture from 
judicial processes and concentrate especially on the role of the development of human 
rights instruments. 
 
There are several theories why torture was abandoned. One theory explains this by the 
loosening of the standards of burden of proof – full proof was no longer required and as 
methods of investigation were improved, circumstantial evidence could be relied more than 
before.
16
 This was made possible by the changes in the nature of justice systems: the 
judicial systems became more centralised and professionalised, and while the power and 
respect of the judges grew, they could rely on free judicial evaluation to give verdicts 
without needing to rely always on either witnesses or confession.
17
The prohibition of 
torture was further facilitated by emerging human rights discourses, which started already 
in the 18
th
 century. The ideas of enlightenment could also have had an effect on banning 
torture, since it was seen as inhumane and ineffective
18
, but moreover enlightenment had 
deep impact on how society was perceived
19
. Since human rights play a crucial role in the 
prohibition of torture in modern world, and since I will concentrate on their role in the 
prohibition of torture in latter analysis, I will discuss their background and origin here in 
greater detail. 
                                                 
15
 Einolf, 2007, 111, 114, 116, 117. 
16
 Pihlajamäki 2013; Einolf 2007, 109. 
17
 Langbein 1977, 55-60. 
18
 Einolf 2007, 109. 
19
 See part 2, chapter 3. 
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The development of the human rights was based on the ideas of natural law – a set of rules 
and norms that are shared by all human kind and which are above and original source of 
domestic laws. The idea of natural rights started to develop during the project of 
enlightenment. This project saw people as individuals, capable of independent thought. 
The enlightenment was seen as a process of awakening, where people would realise their 
own potential and begin to think and question the norms of societies by themselves. This 
mode of thinking was revolutional and it influenced the role of state and church, even 
though many philosophers of the enlightenment (such as Kant, Locke and Rousseau) still 
based their ideas in God as the ultimate power, and source of all rights and reason. The 
difference to medieval times was that God was seen to have given people the ability to 
think and reason, and thus people would no longer be tied to the teaching of priests and 
rulers but could – while still being good God obeying citizens – use their reason and 
question the norms of society, since their reason itself originated from God. 
20
   
 
The celebration of thought and independent reasoning led to development of natural rights 
of individuals that would later develop into human rights. The first signs of people as 
possessors of rights were seen in the independence declaration of the United States, where 
individual people were given certain rights. The events of the independence of the United 
States were source of inspiration for the leaders of the French revolution in 1789, which 
was also heavily impressed by the grand philosophers of the time, such as Montesquieu, 
Kant, Rousseau and Locke. 
21
 Rights were a powerful tool in the hands of the 
revolutionaries, since they were seen to be a force which exists above all laws, and thus the 
power of revolutionaries, which emerged from these rights, could not be curtailed by any 
law or regulation. This unregulated, total power of the revolutionaries soon led to a 
bloodbath also known as terror. The legal system became a tool for representing the power 
of the revolutionaries, who could execute anyone they saw as a threat. After the horrors of 
the revolution became evident and the dangers of the natural rights were revealed, the idea 
of rights of individuals were buried silently for a long period of time. The natural rights 
                                                 
20
 Pirjola 2013:Dark and bright sides of human rights, towards pragmatic evaluation, University of Helsinki, 
Helsinki, 36 ; Douzinas 2002: the end of human rights, Hart publishing, Oxford, 82-90. 
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were considered to be too dangerous and the power was again reconstituted in the state 
structure and laws.
22
 
 
In the next century the human rights discourses started to gain more foothold when the 
horrors of the two world wars were revealed. The development of human rights can be 
seen to have taken place in three phases: first, rights were seen as something that protects 
people from the state and the arbitrary tyranny of the sovereign. In this phase, rights were 
seen to build a certain type of wall of protection around individuals and their lives. One 
example of this kind of human rights discourse is presented by John Locke, who 
emphasised the right of man
23
 to his property.
24
  The next wave of rights was the so called 
“positive” rights. These rights were born when it was considered that merely protection 
from arbitrary state power or oppression would not be sufficient, but that there is a need to 
guarantee also other types of rights, such as right to livelihood, so that people can utilise all 
of their other rights to their full potential.
25
 This is well illustrated in the development of 
the two first remarkable and legally binding human rights treaties: The 1976’s International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 (ICESCR). The first convention concentrates on 
political and civil rights, such as the right to life and family life, and freedom from 
oppression and torture. These rights are often seen to form “the hard core” of the human 
rights, from which no derogations are permitted. The latter treaty guarantees economic and 
social rights, such as right to (fair) work, right to form associations and right to mental and 
physical health. This convention is often seen as less legally binding since its articles are 
written in a vaguer and less concrete form
26
. The 3
rd
 wave of human rights can be argued to 
be the emergence of collective and communal rights. The emergence of these rights is 
largely due to critique presented by the developing countries. They criticized the western 
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foundation of the human rights and argued that also concepts and rights from other cultures 
should be given a status of human rights. Examples of these rights include different rights 
of minorities and native people, and also more general rights, such as the right to clean and 
safe environment. However, there is not any worldwide consensus whether these types of 
rights have gained status of human rights and they are not yet present in many international 
conventions.
27
 
 
The prohibition of torture became also part of the human rights, and it was first articulated 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948
28
. In the next few decades several 
international instruments and conventions concerning prohibition of torture were drafted 
and entered into force, including also some legal systems of enforcement, such as human 
rights courts. This meant that the prohibition of torture had prominently gained its place in 
the international legal system. I will discuss the position of the prohibition of torture in 
modern international law in the next section, and I will also present how torture has despite 
this been used in the 21
st
 century United States. 
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II Torture in the modern era 
 
After the strengthening of the human rights discourses, the prohibition of torture has 
acquired strong position as one of the recognised norms of international law and it has also 
been codified in several human rights conventions and treaties. Nevertheless, torture has 
been used even in the West in the 21
st
 century, most recent case being the torture practiced 
by the United States in its war on terror. 
 
In this section, I will analyse how torture is perceived and practiced in the contemporary 
West – what is the position of torture in international law, how it is defined, and how it is 
still practiced. The purpose of this section is to function as a starting point and introduction 
to latter analysis of torture, especially when discussing torture in the modern era. I will first 
discuss the current position of torture in customary international law, and then analyse how 
the prohibition of torture is defined by looking at different international conventions. I will 
also discuss how these definitions have changed in practices of human rights courts and 
instruments due to critique posed towards them. In the last chapter, I will discuss the use of 
torture by the United States in its war on terror.  
 
 
 
3. Prohibition of torture in customary international law 
 
It has been argued that prohibition of torture could actually have acquired a position of 
customary international law – this would mean that prohibition of torture is so universal 
and important norm, that every state is bound by it, even if they are not parties to any 
convention which would entail the prohibition of torture or if they have not given their 
consent to be bound by such a norm in other ways. There are two possible ways of viewing 
an act as customary international law: the act can be seen as having become part of 
customary international law as such, or it can be seen as a peremptory norm of 
international law (jus cogens). 
 
20 
 
In this chapter I will discuss both of these both prospects in turn: I will first present the 
prohibition of torture as part of norms of customary international law, and then discuss 
whether it could be also seen as a norm of jus cogens. 
 
3.1 Customary international law 
 
First, it can be argued that prohibition of torture has become part of customary 
international law. Customary international law is defined in the statute of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) as one of the sources of international law
29
. In order for a rule to be 
considered customary international law, two conditions must be filled: a constant and 
uniform state practice and opinio juris (which means that states consider the norm as 
binding legal rule) have to exist. Opinio juris is often deducted from the state practice and 
legislation, or treaties concluded
30
: if a state is for example party to a treaty, it is 
considered to accept the norms of that treaty as legally binding. The same can also be 
applied to local legislation.  In practice opinio juris and state practice are often deducted 
from same sources, thus it can be difficult to differentiate between them.
31
 
 
Even though most of the states are parties to the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984 (torture convention) or 
other treaties prohibiting torture, and even though torture is considered illegal in most 
western societies, it has been estimated, that torture is still used officially in around 25 
states and unofficially in more than 130 states
32
. Even in states that officially support the 
prohibition of torture, there have been movements that support the use of torture in some 
cases, such as in war on terror
33
. In this regard, it might be difficult to prove uniform and 
widespread state practice. Nevertheless, international custom can be derived also from 
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other sources than only actual state practice: for example legal writings, official state 
pronouncements and practice of international organisations can be taken into consideration 
when defining whether state practice exists or not.
 34
 It should also be noted, that 
international custom can be seen to be established even if states do actually act opposed to 
it, as long as they nevertheless recognise that norm as binding. Furthermore, 
inconsistencies in state practice do not prevent considering the norm as customary 
international law, if the acts against these rules can be seen as breaches of these rules, and 
general consistency with the rule still exists.
35
 There is also a rather great consensus 
amongst the international legal scholars about the existence of a norm prohibiting torture.
36
 
Even the courts in the United States (which itself has been accused of using torture) has 
recognised the existence of such norm in international law.
37
 This evidence of general 
acceptance of prohibition of torture can be seen to outweigh the possible lack in consistent 
state practice and indicate that a customary rule prohibiting torture in customary 
international law indeed exists.  
 
3.2 Prohibition of torture as a peremptory norm of international law 
 
The other way of viewing the prohibition of torture as a norm of customary international 
law is to argue that it is actually an act against jus cogens, also known as peremptory 
norms of international law. The conception of jus cogens emerged after the Second World 
War and was inspired by the atrocities of wars, especially the ones performed by the Nazi 
regime. There were no internationally binding rules, which would prevent states for 
murdering or torturing its own citizens, but it was recognised in the international 
community that there are some fundamental norms that should not be breached even if 
there isn’t any actual legal written prohibition. The idea of jus cogens was codified in the 
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Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT)
38
, even though some states (such as 
France) have refused to become members of the convention since they oppose the 
inclusion of norm of jus cogens to it.  
 
The difference between “regular” customary international law and norms of jus cogens is, 
that states cannot derive from obeying the norms of jus cogens by any means, and for 
example, all conventions that are in conflict with these norms, are invalid.
39
 The president 
of the drafting committee of the VCLT has stated that a norm of jus cogens doesn’t have to 
be recognised by all states, but it is sufficient that “large majority” of states would accept 
the norm as such. 
40
 This means that small number of states could not prevent norm from 
being accepted as a norm of jus cogens. Even though jus cogens is often viewed as part of 
customary international law, it is good to note that this definition does not in itself require 
that there would be evidence of widespread state practice indicating a norm to be a norm of 
jus cogens – it is merely enough that majority of states considers the norm as such. 41  
 
Even if there isn’t any clear consensus about which norms are the norms that should be 
considered as jus cogens, such norms as the ban of slavery, prohibition of aggression, 
apartheid and genocide have often been considered as such. 
42
 Prohibition of torture is also 
one of the norms that has in, several occasions, been titled as a norm of jus cogens. This 
has, in fact, been the view of International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), as was articulated in the case of Furunǆia43. This view was also adopted by the 
House of Lords in the Pinochet-case 
44
 and courts in the United States
45
. Therefore there 
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are strong grounds to present that prohibition of torture could be considered as a norm of 
jus cogens and thus universally prohibited by international law. 
 
Even if the prohibition of torture is seen to be a norm of customary international law, this 
does not yet explain what acts would actually be considered as torture. I will turn to 
analyse the definition of torture in international law by focusing on different human rights 
institutions and conventions prohibiting torture in the next chapter.  
24 
 
4. Definition of torture in international law 
 
Even though torture is prohibited by international law, in order for the prohibition of 
torture to be effective, there needs to be some general definition of torture. In this chapter I 
aim to analyse the question of what is actually considered as torture in modern 
international law. In practice, torture could be anything from causing direct physical pain 
(such as beatings, cutting, extending or amputating limbs, causing burn injuries or forcing 
persons to stand for long times or live in extremely confined spaces) to acts causing mental 
distress (for example deprivation of sleep, playing loud sounds or music or arranging fake 
executions)
46
. Many of these forms have been used throughout history, but there are also 
new trends, such as using electrical shocks to inflict pain or the technique of 
waterboarding, where person experiences strong feeling of being drowned (it has been 
argued that rape and sexual humiliation have been less used in the earlier times but it might 
also be that they are merely less recorded).
47
  
 
I will start this chapter and the analysis on the definition of torture in international law, by 
discussing how prohibition of torture is codified in different international conventions, 
such as the torture convention, ICCPR and the 1950’s European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR
48
), and the case-law by different human rights courts and institutions, such 
as the Committee against Torture (CAT) and the Human Rights Committee (HRC). In 
latter part of this chapter I will also discuss how this definition has lately changed due to 
different interpretations and critique posed towards it.  
 
4.1 Prohibition of torture in international conventions 
 
Torture convention is a convention particularly designed for prohibiting and preventing 
torture: The convention is rather influential since there are 155 parties and 81 signatories to 
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it.
49
 The torture convention offers detailed definition of torture. It defines torture in its first 
paragraph as follows:  
 
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person, information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a 
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, 
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering 
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. 
50
 
 
This definition includes both mental and physical pain but limits the act of torture to acts 
performed or accepted by a public official or other person in official capacity. Also, a 
certain motive has to be present (acquiring information, punishment or other), and thus acts 
of arbitrary violence, no matter how cruel they are by nature, are not considered as torture. 
It also excludes pain caused by lawful sanctions. Torture convention includes also a 
prohibition to transport people to countries where they are likely to be tortured (this 
principle is known as a principle of non-refoulment).
51
 
 
 The prohibition of torture is expressed also in one of the most influential human rights 
treaties, ICCPR, which states in its article 7 that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or 
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. 52 Similar definition and ban on 
torture can be found in the ECHR article 3.  Other examples of international conventions 
and declarations that include prohibition of torture are 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights
53
, 1949 Geneva Conventions
54
, the 1987 European Convention for the 
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Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment
55
, the 1985 
Inter-American Convention to prevent and Punish Torture
56
 and the 1975 Tokyo 
convention that declares guidelines for physicians in order to prevent torture
57
. The 
prohibition of torture can also be found in almost all domestic legal systems
58
.  
 
 As can be seen, some conventions that prohibit torture prohibit also inhumane and 
degrading treatment in the same article
59
. In many cases the courts have not explicitly 
stated, which acts constitute torture and which inhumane and degrading treatment, but 
merely refer to breach of an article prohibiting both acts. HRC 
60
 has explicitly stated that 
“The Covenant (ICCPR) does not contain any definition of the concepts covered by article 
7 nor does the Committee consider it necessary to draw up a list of prohibited acts or to 
establish sharp distinctions between the different types of punishment or treatment; the 
distinctions depend on the nature, purpose and severity of the treatment applied”61. The 
ECHR does not specify the term torture either. It has been argued, that the interpretation of 
the distinction between inhumane and degrading treatment and torture should be done on 
both objective and subjective basis, and attention should be paid to all the circumstances of 
the case.
 62
 These include the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, 
in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim.
63
 The distinction between 
inhumane and degrading treatment and torture has also been argued to be in the intensity of 
the treatment, and that in order for an act to be torture certain threshold of severity has to 
be crossed.
64
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4.2 Changes in the definition of torture 
 
The interpretation of how torture is defined can be seen to have also evolved in time, in the 
practices of the human rights courts. This can be seen in practices of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR). In one occasion the court held that techniques, such as sleep 
deprivation, painful positions, deprivation of nourishment, subjection to noise and hooding 
(“the five techniques”), did amount to inhumane and degrading treatment, but not to 
torture, since they did not reach the threshold of particular intensity and cruelty.
65
 In later 
cases ECtHR has stated that the convention is a living instrument, and some acts that were 
not before defined as torture, could be now defined as such.
66
 Following this, the court has 
later stated, that acts, such as hanging a person from ceiling and blows to the head 
67
 can be 
considered as torture. The development has not nevertheless been completely uniform: for 
example, in the decision of 1997 Aydin v. Turkey, rape was seen to constitute torture, but 
some years later in 2001 in case Cyprus v. Turkey
68
, the act of rape was seen as an 
inhumane treatment but not torture. The development of the definition of torture is thus not 
linear, but the definition can vary in time and according to particular conditions of the case 
as well. 
 
The degree to which these conditions are applied varies also in time and according to 
different conventions and bodies interpreting them. For example CAT, which is a body of 
independent experts that monitor the implementation of the torture convention, has argued 
that, in order to breach the convention, state has to have actual knowledge of the act and 
practically refuse to act to prevent the situation, whereas the Human rights committee has 
argued that state negligence could also be seen as constitutive element, if the state has not 
taken sufficient measures to guarantee that no acts of torture will take place, and thus has 
breached its obligation to due diligence.
69
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The definition of torture, as well as other norms of human rights in international law, have 
also been criticised by many academics, and this critique is one factor that has affected the 
way in which definitions of torture are interpreted in practice. One influential source of 
criticism is the feminist or gender-based critique, which argues that human rights norms 
are mainly masculine in a sense that they are created to protect mainly the interests of men, 
who are seen to act as a model for the “universal human”. Feminists critique points out, 
that for example in the definition of torture, people are protected from state violence, 
whereas women encounter violence most often at home. Since the sphere of private life is 
often seen as something outside the intervention, but at the same time protection, of state, 
most human rights norms such as prohibition of torture do not protect women where they 
would need protection most.
70
  On the other hand, some feminist scholars have argued that 
the whole approach of women as belonging to the sphere of home and private and men as 
actors in the public sphere is itself based on gender-stereotypes and that also women can 
participate in the public sphere in societies. Feminist writers have also criticised the whole 
feminist critique from displaying women as a uniform group, even though there are several 
cultural and other personal differences (such as disability, poverty, ethnicity) amongst 
women, which affect the fulfilment of their rights much more than the fact that they are 
women and that feminist critique is mainly based on needs of western women.
71
 
 
These concerns and critique have been noted to at least to some degree in different human 
rights instruments, and they have affected the way in which the interpretation of the 
definition of torture has evolved. This can be seen how in for example HRC and CAT have 
stated that rape (which affects women in bigger scale than men), genital mutilation or 
domestic violence could constitute torture (even though in these cases as well the act of 
abuse has to be connected to state at least in level of state’s negligence in its duty to protect 
individuals from this type of violence). The practice concerning these issues is 
inconsistent, but developments towards more gender-oriented definition of torture can be 
seen.
72
 
 
Another problem in defining torture, as already displayed by the feminist critique, is that 
the scope of acts considered to be torture is extremely culture-bound. The European 
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commission has also articulated the problem of relativity of definition of torture in 
different countries and cases in Greek Case: “…certain roughness of treatment…is 
tolerated by most detainees and even taken for granted. This underlines the fact that the 
point up to which prisoners and the public may accept physical violence as being neither 
cruel nor excessive, varies between different societies and even between different sections 
of them.”73 
 
From all these conventions and institutions interpreting them, it can be seen that there is no 
single definition of torture in international law. Despite this, most international scholars 
and bodies tend to agree on four constitutive elements of torture which distinguish it from 
other types of pain and suffering caused. These elements are: nature of the act, intention of 
the perpetrator, purpose and involvement of public officials or persons of similar capacity.  
These conditions should not however be interpreted strictly but on case by case -basis. The 
United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Manfred Novak has suggested that torture should be defined by 
not evaluating the severity of the act, but focusing on the element of purpose of the 
conduct and powerlessness of the victim, since this is the constituting element of torture.
74
 
I will adopt a very similar position in the later chapters, where I discuss the nature of 
torture as a sociological phenomenon. I will use the above-mentioned elements of torture 
as a starting point, but concentrate, not on the fulfilment of external conditions of torture, 
but on the power-relations it presents and recreates. 
 
So far I have discussed the position of torture and its definition in modern international law 
from a general perspective, and aimed to provide answer to the first research question on 
how torture changed from common legal practice to act against jus cogens from legal view. 
In the next chapter I will turn to analyse the second question,  and present how torture is in 
practice used in the 21
st
 century West, by introducing the case of torture practiced by the 
United States in its war on terror. 
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5. Torture in the 21
st
 century – the case of the United States 
 
From the 20
th
 century onwards, the prohibition of torture has developed in two ways: in 
theoretical and political levels, the human rights discourses have been getting stronger as 
can be seen in, for example, in how prohibition of torture has become an internationally 
condemned act and norm of jus cogens. In practice, the use of torture has nevertheless not 
vanished, and it has reappeared especially in war and conflict situations and authoritarian 
regimes during the Second World War. Most recent case of torture in the 21
st
 century in 
the West is how the United States has been accused of using torture in the post-9/11 war on 
terror. In this chapter I turn to this case and aim to analyse and answer the second research 
question on why the United States has used torture despite this being prohibited by 
international law. I will do this by first presenting some accusations and evidence 
concerning the use of torture practised by the United States, and then discussing the ways 
in which the United States authorities have tried to justify this use of torture. 
 
5.1 Torture in the war on terror 
 
I will start by presenting how the United States has been using torture in its war on terror, 
and how this has been criticised. Even though the United States has itself declared that it 
opposes torture
75
, and even though it is party to different conventions prohibiting torture 
(such as torture convention
76
 and ICCPR), there are several accusations and evidence 
suggesting that the United States indeed has used torture, especially on persons suspected 
from terrorism. One of the sources are the reports by detainees, who claim that they have 
been tortured by the United States in the war on terror. These statements have been 
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presented in e.g. court trials, where the United States Secretary of Defence and other staff 
have been accused for the acts of torture.
77
 All plaintiffs in these cases asserted that they 
have been sexually humiliated and physically injured and battered – the acts include sleep 
deprivation, stripping naked, beatings and being photographed.
78
 Other sources include a 
report by the international committee of the Red Cross, which was allowed to visit 
detainees in Guantanamo. The report leaked to public and revealed signs of maltreatment 
that could amount to torture: the detainees were exposed to use of forced positions, 
extreme temperature changes, humiliating acts and beatings. In the report the treatment 
was described as “cruel, unusual, degrading treatment and a form of torture”. 79 There have 
also been some reports by the federal staff, such as e-mail by one of the agents of the 
federal Bureau of Investigation reporting abuse he had witnessed in Guantanamo. The 
agent reported detainees being held in stress positions for several hours or even days, and 
being subjected to extreme temperatures and loud music. Many had shown symptoms of 
extreme stress (such as urinating or defecating on themselves or pulling their hair off).
 80
 
There have also been reports by anonymous officials, who have confirmed the use of 
similar techniques. One of the most descriptive statements of the situation of the persons 
detained by the United States in the war on terror is a quote of Cofer Black, head of CIA 
counterterrorist centre, who famously stated that “After 9/11 the gloves come off”.81 
 
The use of torture by the United States has received plenty of critique from different 
human rights agencies, other states and also by internal political groups in the United 
States itself. Critique has been directed towards both, the usefulness of torture and its 
morality. 
82
 Next, I will turn to discuss the ways the United States has answered to this 
critique and aimed to justify its use of torture. 
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5.2 Justified torture? 
 
There have been two different tactics by witch representatives of the United States have 
defended the use of these acts that can be seen to amount to torture. One is denial of these 
events taking place, and the other is the justification of these acts. Officials of the United 
States have often stated that the United States does not torture 
83
, but even Pentagon has 
had to alter its statement after the evidence of maltreatment started to pile up, and stated 
that it complies with the treaties (banning abusive treatment of detainees), to the extent 
possible in the middle of the war. 
84
  The authorities of the United States have also tried to 
alter the definition of torture, stating that only acts that create suffering paramount to, for 
example, organ failure of death, can amount to torture, and thus harsh methods used in 
interrogations are not torture.
85
 President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld have also 
confirmed this idea of justification for abusive acts. Rumsfeld has even authorised the use 
of stress-positions, removal of stimuli, and removal of clothing in Guantanamo 
interrogations between December 2002 and January 2003.
 86
 The other defence against 
accusations of abuse and torture is that it was justified due to exceptional circumstances. 
The United States has often pointed to the events of the 9/11 and claimed that the war on 
terror is so unique and exceptional compared to regular wars, that normal laws of war 
(such as the Geneva conventions) do not apply to the enemy combatants.
87
 This opinion 
was later contradicted by the Supreme Court of the United States, which declared that 
provisions of Geneva Convention do apply to Al-Qaida detainees.
88
 The United States has 
also tried to justify its actions by stating that the gains (prevention of new terrorist strikes) 
outweigh the possible human right violations.
89
  
 
So far I have analysed the use of torture and aimed to analyse and provide answers to the 
research questions from legal perspective, by presenting how torture turned from judicial 
procedures to an act against international law after the strengthening of the human rights 
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discourses, and how torture is despite this still practice by the United States in the 21
st
 
century. I have also discussed the history and current position of the use of torture in 
domestic systems and in international law. In the next part of this thesis I will continue this 
analysis and aim to provide different view on these questions by approaching the use of 
torture from sociological perspective. 
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PART 2 
SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF TORTURE 
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INTORODUCTION TO PART 2 
 
In previous chapters I have analysed and answered the research questions from a legal 
perspective by concentrating on how torture has been used in history in Europe and the 
modern United States and what is its position in international law. In this chapter I will 
approach torture from a sociological perspective. I will use sociological approach, since 
torture entails and expresses certain type of unequal power-relation due to its 
connectedness to state power, and thus sociological approach helps to better understand 
and analyse and provide a complementary view on the use of torture. In this analysis I will 
look at the different powers and forces present in the society. I will also discuss what types 
of mechanisms and forces are used to control the population and reinforce and recreate 
these power relations and concentrate especially on the role of the human rights in these 
processes. 
 
This part of the thesis is divided into four sections. In the first section, I will explain some 
core ideas of Foucault concentrating on three different types of power: sovereign, 
governmental and disciplinary power. I will use these concepts later to analyse and explain 
the changes in the use of torture in three different eras: first, in the second section, I will 
concentrate on the medieval era and analyse how the sovereign power used torture to 
reinstate and recreate its power. Next, in the third section, I will look at the decrease of 
torture from the early modern period onwards and see how this could be explained by the 
emergence of new forms of ruling, using Foucault’s ideas of new ways of governing 
people. I will also present the emergence of human rights discourses, as a part of this 
process, and analyse their role in controlling people, and justifying and enforcing the 
sovereign power at the domestic level. In the fourth section I will analyse the latest re-
emergence of torture in the 21
st
 century by using these same concepts and seeing how new 
type of sovereign power and mechanisms of governing people using security discourses 
have enabled the use of torture. I will also analyse how human rights form a part of this 
process, and how they are used by the sovereign power at the national and international 
levels.  
36 
 
I Foucault and power - the theoretical framework 
 
I will start the analysis on the use of torture in societies by shortly presenting some central 
concepts of Foucault and his theories. Foucault is much quoted sociologist, and his theories 
have been used, developed and interpreted by many other sociologist, even though many of 
his ideas have only been presented in his lectures. For these reasons, his concepts and ideas 
have gotten different meanings depending on the time and person using them. Due to these 
factors, I will not attempt to provide deep or exhaustive analysis on his work but only use 
some of his most well-known ideas and concepts as a foundation for my analysis on the 
use of torture. This is also why definitions and terms I will use might differ from other 
writers and theorists explaining the work of Foucault. 
 
In this thesis, I will concentrate on analysing the power-structures in society by using three 
main concepts of power presented by Foucault: sovereign, disciplinary and governmental 
power. I will first introduce Foucault’s notion of power in general and then present shortly 
these three main types of power in turn, and how they relate to each other. This analysis 
will form an introduction to the different sociological concepts I will use in the latter 
sections of this part of the thesis, and I will discuss these concepts in greater detail in 
becoming chapters. 
 
I will begin by presenting some general thoughts of Foucault on power. Foucault has 
analysed the concept of power in many of his writings since 1970’s, and it can be said to 
be one of his main concepts.
90
 He is interested in how power is used in societies and how 
its use has changed throughout the history. Foucault explains the use of power as a force 
that pierces the society and every person in it: it affects how people communicate, think, 
believe, and express themselves.  He sees power as an all-piercing force, which is fluid and 
independent from all structures and institutions and appears and affects all functions in the 
society. Foucault examines power as a form of relations between subjects: Power is not a 
quality or measurable object, but a complex strategic situation.
91
 Since power is not 
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dependant on any institution or object, it functions beyond the state and it is not dependent 
on any state structures.
92
 
 
Foucault uses the idea of different types of power in his analysis on the ways of control 
and governing people in different eras. He argues that pre-modern societies were governed 
mainly using coercion and violence, whereas in modern societies there are other, more 
sophisticated and complicated strategies and structures in place, that control and govern 
people. The very fundamental idea presented in Foucault’s analysis of power is that in 
modern societies, power is used to create norms and to make individuals internalize these 
norms to their own modes of action: In this way, there is no need for external coercion 
since people supervise and control themselves.
93
  
 
 Foucault explains these different methods of governing by differentiating three main 
forms of power in societies
94
. These forms of power are sovereign power, disciplinary 
power and governmental power. Sovereign power could be seen as the most traditional 
concept of these three
95
, and its object is to exercise authority over the subjects of the state 
within a defined territory. Disciplinary power concentrates on the exercise of power over 
the individual concentrating on the body and capacities of the individuals. Its object is the 
regulation and ordering of the numbers of people within the territory ruled by the sovereign 
power, aiming to create docile bodies that can be controlled. Disciplinary power functions 
mainly through different institutions and practices, such as school and military, which are 
in place to form and educate people. The governmental power in turn, has gained 
prominence later in the modern societies, and it has been defined in many ways
 96
. 
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Governmental power is a force that sees the individuals in the society as members of 
population, and as a resource to be fostered, used and optimised. 
97
 It is concerned about 
the protection of the population and it uses different techniques and institutions of the 
sovereign and disciplinary powers to achieve these goals.  
 
Foucault argues that these three powers are all the time present in the society. They can be 
visualised as forming a triangle, where all three powers are in connection and relation to 
one another, and which have population as their main target. Even though all these powers 
are connected, the relation between the three powers is, however, not constant: In pre-
modern era, the dominant force in the society was sovereign power, which used violence to 
control people and reinstate and gain power. In modern era the techniques of discipline 
started to evolve, and governmental power gained also prominence leading to emergence 
of modern societies, controlled by these forces, (which I will later refer to as the new ways 
or forms of governing).  Even though some form of power might be pre-eminent in some 
period of time, or type of society, the other forms of power do not disappear – only their 
relations change. 
98
 
 
These powers function by using different mechanisms and institutions. One essential 
mechanism for the function of all the three powers is what Foucault titled technologies, 
apparatuses or mechanisms of security. These mechanisms are different systems and 
institutions that function in the society, such as ones that care and maintain the health and 
well-being of people in the society. The reason why the mechanisms are needed is that they 
are used to protect the society from different types of threats. The idea of constant threats 
endangering the existence of people in the society is based in the idea that the population is 
seen as an entity, the biological existence of which is being constantly threatened. 
99
 
 
I will discuss these mechanisms and the three different forms of power presented here in 
greater detail in the becoming chapters, where I use them to analyse the changes in the use 
of torture. First, I will analyse the use of torture in medieval times, and see how torture can 
be used as a tool of the sovereign power to recreate and reinstall its power. Then I will 
discuss the decrease in the use of torture, by referring to the strengthening importance of 
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the new forms of governing as an explanation for the decrease of the use of torture. I will 
also analyse the role of human rights in this development. In the last section, I will discuss 
the mechanisms of security, through which these powers function, and use them to analyse 
the use of torture in the 21
st
 century United States in its war on terror, and see how the 
human rights relate to this. 
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II Torture in the medieval times  
 
In this section I will start to answer and analyse the first research question of this thesis 
(why the use of torture changed from a common legal practice to an act prohibited by 
international law?) from a sociological perspective. In this section I will concentrate on the 
use of torture in medieval times, and in the next section I will continue this analysis by 
focusing on the decrease in, and prohibition of the use of torture.  
 
I will start this section by examining the unequal power-relations that are expressed in the 
act of torture. This feature is consequence from the idea that torture is always linked to 
state authorities and that victims on the other hand, are individuals. Analysing this nature 
of torture will form a base for the next part of the analysis in this chapter, which will be 
concentrated on Foucault’s ideas of how the act of torture is an expression of sovereign 
power over a body of individual people – a process in which the sovereign power is re-
enacted and reinstated through violence, but which can also pose dangers to the sovereign.  
 
 
1. Torture as an unequal act 
 
In the first part of this thesis I presented different definitions of torture in international law. 
These definitions concentrated on the external conditions and the nature of the act. In this 
chapter I will approach the notion of torture from sociological perspective, and analyse 
what kind of different power-relations it presents and recreates. 
 
One fundamental feature of torture, which makes it unique form of violence, is inequality – 
torture is rarely used in relations between two equals, but it is seen rather as a phenomenon 
where one submits other person to his/her will and under his/her power, causing the other 
person involuntary pain and suffering without real fear of (at least imminent) retribution.
100
 
This separates the notion of torture from other type of violence – in regular fight for 
example, attack towards other person submits the attacker to a threat of counterattack: even 
if the other person is in a physically inferior position there is always a possibility that the 
victim can fight back (for example by using different weapons) or escape.  
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The unequal nature of torture is displayed in the way in which, already in the ancient 
times
101
, torture was practiced only towards slaves or second class citizens or non-citizens.
 
102
 It has also been argued that torture never gain foothold in England, since legal system 
functioned very locally and people would thus be less willing to torture or see person being 
tortured if this person was a member of their own community.
103
 The same ideology can be 
seen to have prevailed in high classes of medieval Europe, where disputes between equals 
could be solved by a duel, where both sides would acquire similar methods or protection 
and change to fight back, whereas a stubborn servant or lower class citizen could be 
subjected to one-sided, uncontrolled violence.
104
 Thus, in the act of torture there is always 
an unequal relationship between the two: there is a subject that tortures (the suppressor), 
and the object that is being tortured (the suppressed) and the suffering of the tortured is 
one-sided and inescapable. 
 
The unequal nature of torture can be seen also in the change of the juridical system from 
ordeals to trials with system of standard of proof: before the judge was merely enacting the 
will of God presented in the body of accused, but in later times, the power to decide one’s 
guilt was installed in the judicial process itself, which derived its justification from the 
power of the sovereign. 
105
 Torture can thus be seen to have acted as means of enhancing 
the power and legitimation of the judicial system and the sovereign, since it communicated 
very visibly the unequal relationship between the people and the sovereign power. I will 
turn to analyse this use of torture by the sovereign in the next chapter. 
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2. Torture and the sovereign 
 
In this chapter I will turn again to the concepts of power presented by Foucault and analyse 
their relation to the use of torture in the medieval times. I will do this by introducing the 
way in which Foucault presents the use of torture as an expression of the sovereign power. 
I will start by further analysing the notion of the sovereign power by shortly presenting the 
history of the notion of sovereign. Then I will present Foucault’s ideas on sovereign power 
in greater detail and how torture can be used as an expression of this power. In the last 
section I will also present some risks that using torture can pose to the sovereign. 
 
2.1 The sovereign 
 
I will first discuss the different notions of sovereign and sovereign power and how these 
have changed throughout the history. These notions are one of the key elements in 
sociological theories, and they have been used by many other theorists as well. First 
sovereign was understood as the ruler (most often the king) who got his powers from God, 
and was the sole supreme ruler, and the source of all power and rules in the society. Later a 
more theoretical approach towards the notion of sovereign emerged. Hobbes defined the 
sovereign in his famous writing “Leviathan” as the ultimate ruler of the people, who was 
not bound by any laws, even the ones he had constructed himself.  Nevertheless, in theory, 
he had gained all of his powers from the people who in this way formed the body of the 
state. Another famous idea of sovereign is explained in sociological theory by Weber as 
monopoly of violence over a defined territory. Foucault, in turn, defines sovereign as a 
negative force that can extract from its subjects: for example, sovereign has the power to 
collect taxes (to take wealth) or even power to kill (to take a life).
106
 In both Foucault‘s and 
Weber’s theories the notion of sovereign is closely connected to the idea of territory. 
Sovereign controls a physical space (territory) which is inhabited by the subjects of the 
sovereign.
107
 This idea is also presented at the international level: for example, the charter 
of the United Nations is based on the idea that international legal field is constructed by 
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individual sovereign states that rule their respective territories and population within.
108
 
This reflects also the same idea of sovereign as a source of negative coercive force in the 
society and within a territory. According to Foucault, one central feature of the sovereign is 
that it is not dependent on any external force but is grounded only in itself. Another feature 
is that it has itself as the highest aim – it does not seek anything else but to enforce itself 
and maintain itself by enhancing its position as the controlling force of the society and 
territory.
109
 
 
As can be seen, the term "sovereign” can be used in very different context and it can bear 
different meanings. In the first part of this thesis, I have used the term “sovereign” when 
referring to the concept in the context of international law (meaning sovereign states as 
they are presented in international law). In this part of the thesis, I will use the concept of 
sovereign in its sociological context, referring to above presented theories of sovereign and 
Foucault’s concept of sovereign power. Next, I will turn to analyse the relation of the 
sovereign to the use of torture by using these ideas of soverign and power presented by 
Foucault. 
 
2.2 Torture as a display of sovereign power over a body 
 
I will now turn to discuss the relation between torture and the sovereign. The unequal 
nature of torture, which I have presented above
110
, makes it an act that can be used to 
express and reinstate different power relations in society. Foucault discusses the 
relationship between torture and the sovereign in his book “Discipline and Punish - the 
birth of prison”.111 He concentrates on analysing torture as a means of punishment for 
violation of the law and rules of the society. He argues that in pre-modern societies, since 
all the laws emerged from the sovereign, a person who broke these laws was actually 
committing a crime against the sovereign itself. This crime had to be revenged and thus 
cruel violence and torture were used. Torture and violence were seen as an expression of 
sovereign power (the right to cause pain and the ultimate right to take life) over the body of 
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a subject. The subject has no power over the violence, all it can do is to surrender and 
submit itself to the sovereign, thus recognizing the sovereign’s power. This can be 
achieved by, for example, extracting a confession from a tortured person. 
112
 
 
The use of torture was also linked to the private nature of the trials: up to the 17
th
 century 
in continental Europe, the trials were held in secrecy. In these processes, even the accused 
could not take part in the process, since the trial and the truth that it revealed were seen to 
be the sole right of the sovereign, and only actors designated by the sovereign could take 
part in forming the sentence and finding out the real truth, which would be then enacted in 
punishment.
113
 Foucault argues that since the trials were secret, the cries of the punished 
completed the penal liturgy by creating a public counterforce for the secrecy of the trial.
114
 
 
The publicity of the punishment had also other purposes. In the act of torture (which often 
ended in execution), the condemned person was seen as the opposite of the king – he or she 
was seen as a representation of complete lack of power in the face of the all-mighty 
sovereign, who could punish, torture and take the life of its subject by its own will.
115
 
Presenting this contrast between the sovereign and the powerless subject helped to 
represent and reconstitute the sovereign power. At the same time the public was also used 
to help to enact the revenge of the sovereign: The crowd would often cheer at the violence 
and mock the accused, and at the same time, they took part in the public process of 
punishment. The publicity was also used to set an example and cause people to obey the 
sovereign by intimidation and terror and presenting that there were concrete consequences 
for disobeying the sovereign power.
116
 
 
As can be seen, the act of torture is closely linked to sovereign and the use of power, since 
due to its inherently unequal nature, torture is a form of violence that can be used by the 
sovereign to express and recreate its power over its subjects. During the medieval times, 
the body of sovereign changed several times, and the role of religion faded, but these 
mechanisms of control by fear and violence stayed in place. Even if the ruler itself 
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changed, the way its power was expressed still remained the same until the development of 
new ways of control (I will discuss these in the next section).  
 
2.3 Risks of torture 
 
The use of torture was not, however, without risks. Foucault discusses in his writings some 
of the dangers that the use of violence poses for the sovereign. Firstly, when torture was 
used as a mean of extracting a confession, the tortured could gain freedom if he resisted the 
torture long enough and did not confess.  Also in cases where this would still lead to the 
condemnation of the person (for example due to appearance of witnesses), the confession 
would not be used as an element reinforcing the sovereign power, and thus the revenge and 
justification for the use of violence by the sovereign would not be completed.
117
 Secondly, 
since the crowd was engaged in the process of torture there was also a chance that the 
crowd could see that the use of violence was unjust and they could rise to revolt, and try to 
save the condemned person from the execution.
118
 
 
Paul Kahn also discusses the need for justification for the sovereign power in cases where 
the sovereign uses violence towards its subjects. Kahn also admits that the sovereign has a 
monopoly of violence over its subjects, but underlines that this violence has to be justified 
in one way or another:  The sovereign has to demonstrate the existence of an enemy, 
towards which the violence is directed. If the sovereign cannot establish the existence of an 
enemy, violence becomes merely arbitrary, and the power of sovereign to take life 
becomes, not an act of sovereign control, but a murder. This is caused by the way in which 
the sovereign gains its powers from two sources: the use of violence and the awe of its 
subjects. In order for the subjects to awe the might of the sovereign, the subjects have to be 
able to see the sovereign as the justified authority and its actions as just. Thus, there is 
always a risk when the sovereign resorts to use of violence, because if the enemy is not 
established there is no awe and the sovereign risks losing its legitimacy in the face of its 
subjects.
119
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As a summary, the use of torture can be argued to be important factor in upholding the 
sovereign rule in medieval era in Europe. This is due to the fact that in theory the ruler got 
his or hers power from God, but in practice the states were not very tightly structured and 
areas were not often too closely connected to the ruler on ideological level, so the 
sovereign had to recourse to violence as means of control.  As I have presented in previous 
chapters, torture was first commonly used by the state authorities in the use of ordeals and 
then in different types of trials. In ordeals, torture might be considered to be less severe, 
since it consisted often of only one trial, and the violence used was not as excessive as in 
torture used in later trials. Nevertheless, in ordeals as well, the power of God (and at the 
same time, the power of the ruler who gained his powers directly from God) was enacted 
in the body of the accused. Later torture became institutionalised, and trials became seen as 
the expression of sovereign power. The criminals were people who had breached the order 
of the society codified in law. Since the sovereign power was the sole origin of the law, 
defying these laws defied the rule of the sovereign. These deviants were subjected to 
violence by the sovereign - a process in which they were forced to confess or submit to the 
rule of the sovereign reinstating and reinforcing its power. The acts of execution and 
torture were public and so the other subjects were given a chance to witness this 
demonstration of sovereign power in the body of the criminal, enhancing the power and 
helping to enact the revenge of the sovereign, as well as being subjected to intimidation 
and thus incentive to obey to the sovereign, whose powers were derived from this awe, fear 
and violence.  However, this resort to violence can also pose risks to the sovereign power 
and cause it to lose its legitimacy in the face of the population it aims to control. These 
risks can be one reason why the use of torture was later abandoned, amongst with 
development of new ways of controlling and governing people. I will turn to analyse these 
reasons in greater length in the next section. 
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III The decrease of torture 
 
There are several competing theories that can explain the decrease of torture. For example, 
as presented in the previous chapter, the risks of torture for the sovereign can be one reason 
for its diminishing use. One other theory is that the development of medical profession 
facilitated a change in how pain was perceived – it changed from a spiritual cleansing 
experience to include only negative connotations and thus, the use of torture diminished. 
120
 Even though these types of other theories might have some effect on this decrease in the 
use of torture, I will focus on the changes in the concept of the society and the ways of 
controlling people, including the emergence of human rights, as the main causes for the 
decrease in the use of torture. In this process of change, the society transformed from 
community of objects controlled by coercion exercised by the sovereign to a unit of 
individual subjects that possessed rights and composed the body of the nation, creating 
nation-states. When looking at this phenomenon using concepts of Foucault, it can be seen 
that the rule of sovereign power gave way to disciplinary and governmental powers, 
creating new, modern ways to control population, including the development of human 
rights discourses, which in turn caused the decrease of the use of torture.  
 
 I will begin this section by analysing the development of changes in the concep of state 
and development of modern nation states. This will act as a background for the latter 
analysis. Then I will focus on the new ways of controlling and governing people, and argue 
that changes in the new ways of governing, as presented by Foucault, can be used to 
explain the decrease in the use of torture form the early modern period onwards. In the last 
section, I will also analyse the role of human rights in these new ways of governing and 
their relation to sovereign power, and the part that they play in the process of diminishing 
use of torture.  
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3. From objects to subjects - the birth of nation-states 
 
I will start my analysis on the decrease of torture by first focusing on the changes that took 
place in the society from the early modern period onwards. The fundamental change in the 
structure and concept of the state, which later gave rise to new forms of governing, begun 
around the 18
th
 century, together with the birth of the enlightenment. In the enlightenment, 
people were seen to possess reason and they were encouraged to use this reason to question 
the existing structures and think for themselves instead of playing a role of obedient 
subjects to the ruler. Several philosophers of the time started to develop ideas of people as 
the source of power and legitimation for rule in the societies and these ideas gave rise to 
several theories of social contract. For example, Hobbes argued that human in a state of 
nature would be living in a state of constant chaos and violence, where everyone would try 
to advance only their own interests. The society would be a game of survival of the fittest 
and the only way to escape this cruel and violent environment would be to give absolute 
control to the sovereign ruler. Even though the new sovereign ruler could resemble the 
existing system of ruling monarchs, the fundamental change in the system of thought was 
that the ruler would get his legitimation to rule from the people, and not by God or the 
sovereign itself. There were other theories of social contract that differed in the way they 
saw, for example, the state of nature, but the common denominator was that they viewed 
the power of the sovereign originating from the people who composed the body of the 
state.
121
  
 
These new ideas facilitated the creation of nation-states: in Europe from the early modern 
period onwards, the idea of sovereign nation-states, composed of individual subjects (the 
nationals) became a shared mainstream ideology. The idea of sovereign power, which was 
authorised by the people, led to the birth of the idea of democracy, as individual people 
were seen to be entitled and fit to make decisions regarding rules in the society. Even in 
societies that remained monarchies, systems of parliamentary democracy became popular. 
This affected also how the international relations between states were seen. The world was 
not anymore constructed by royal ruling families, who fought for power amongst 
themselves and the church, dividing the territories as they saw fit. Instead, the founding 
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unit of international order was seen to be an area of a sovereign nation-state inhabited by 
people of similar ethnic and cultural background, forming one nation.
122
 These changes in 
the concept of state were not the only changes that took place from the early modern period 
onwards: Major changes also took place in the way power structures were organised in the 
societies. I will discuss these changes next, by analysing in greater detail the three different 
concepts of power presented in the beginning of this section and using them to analyse the 
changes that took place in societies and their relations to decrease in the use of torture. 
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4. The new forms of governing  
 
As can be seen, the structure of the society and the concept of sovereign were going 
through a fundamental change in the early modern period in Europe. The sovereign was no 
longer seen an individual ruler who could impose his power on its subjects using violence, 
but it had changed into an abstract idea of contract or consent of the people themselves 
who’s will was enacted by medium of the sovereign. This signified a great change in the 
way people were controlled and how the sovereign functioned: The great question was 
how the population could be controlled when they themselves were the source of power of 
the sovereign, and thus people could not be forced anymore to submit to a power of the 
sovereign through simple institutions of violence and threat
123
.  
 
Foucoult provides and answer to this question by referring to governmental and 
disciplinary powers that evolved and gained power from the early modern period onwards. 
In this chapter, I will present these new forces and ways of control in greater detail, and 
then analyse how the form of the violence has changed in modern societies. 
   
4.1 Disciplinary and governmental powers  
 
I will begin by presenting some of Foucault’s ideas of how the system of control changed 
from coercion by force to other, more subtle means of control. These modern ways of 
control are based on the already mentioned idea of having people internalise the norms of 
the society to their own modes of action, so that they would follow them by their own will 
and no external coercion would be needed. This internalisation process is achieved by 
system of new ways of governing, including disciplinary and governmental powers.  
 
As already mentioned, one central power in the new ways of control according to Foucault, 
is discipline. Discipline functions in different institutions and practices concerning the 
exercise of power over the individual’s body (such as schools, monasteries and armies) that 
expanded and intensified from the 17
th
 century onwards, along with the bureaucratization 
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of state institutions and practices. 
124
 Foucault illustrates this development of disciplinary 
techniques and analyses the changes in the use of power that have taken place in societies 
since the medieval era by distinguishing 3 different technologies of power from the 
medieval era to the early modern period. He analyses them using the notions of sovereign, 
law and body. The oldest technology is centered on the notions of sovereign and ceremony, 
and it sees subjects as possible enemies to be vanquished and objects to be controlled. At 
this period, as already been discussed, torture was a common feature of legal systems, and 
it was used by the sovereign to reinstate its power and control over the population. The two 
other technologies appeared in the late 18
th
 century. The first technology was centred on 
law and social body of the society. It saw the people as juridical subjects and used legal 
norms, to maintain the control in the society. Another system used at those times and 
which eventually became the dominant technology was the system concentrated on 
physical body. It saw people as individuals subject to coercion using exercise as a mean to 
correct people. This can be seen in how legal systems and punishment begun to use 
controlling and reforming the individual bodies by subjecting them to different types of 
physical exercises and training. This disciplinary method was used also in other parts of 
society: The control of space, activities, and bodies was seen to lead to increased 
productivity and this led to the rearrangement of factories and working places in the 
industrial era. 
125
  
 
Foucault describes discipline as a set of physico-political techniques that aim to control 
and reform the body of its subjects. These techniques are used in the government and 
control of people. The way, in which discipline and disciplinary powers work, is that they 
grade, qualify, and discipline the governed object. Discipline works through imposing 
norms, to which the subjects of control are compared to (or to which they are encouraged 
to compare themselves). This constant evaluation and aim to fulfil the norms normalizes 
and imposes homogeneity in the society. At the same time this technique individualizes its 
objects by pointing out the abnormalities and subjects that do not fit the norms.
126
 One 
example of the use of disciplinary techniques can be found in the education system: In 
schools all children receive grades that measure constantly their performance. At the same 
time, they are compared to the set of norms (grades) and are encouraged to aim for the 
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object defined by the rulers of the system (the highest grade). The grades act not only as a 
qualificating instance, but also at the same time a system of discipline and punishment – 
the poor grades are frowned upon and the pupils are being told that their performance is 
not sufficient.
127
 
 
Foucault illustrated this mechanism of modern type of governing by referring to the idea of 
‘panopticon’, an idea of a prison where inmates were constantly supervised in a way that 
they did not know themselves whether they were supervised or not. This meant that all of 
the inmate’s acts would be visible to supervisors at any moment, but the detainees 
themselves could not see the supervisor.
128
 The rationality behind this is that the people 
would then start to supervise themselves and correct their behaviour to correspond to the 
expectations of the others. This type of invisible control would eventually lead to 
internalization of the norms – people would start to consider the norms as their own and 
would thus follow them without any further encouragement or threat of punishment.  
 
Other central type of power presented by Foucault in his later writings and lectures is 
governmental power. Governmental power functions with the sovereign and disciplinary 
powers, and its aim is to optimise and protect the individuals, since it sees these individuals 
as an essential resource of the society.
129
 The governmental power is contrary to the 
discipline in a way that where discipline takes norms as a starting point that it tries to 
impose to reality, the governmental power takes reality as a starting point and aims to 
reach optimals in it
130
. Governmental power is thus a positive force. In this sense it is also 
opposing force to the sovereign power, since whereas the sovereign is a negative force that 
gains its power through the ability to extract resources from the society and control life and 
death, governmental power aims to nurture the population of the society, which it sees as a 
resource and object to be protected. Governmental and sovereign powers are not, however, 
exclusive, since they both need each other: Governmental power uses the controlled 
territory of the sovereign and the people within it as its resource, and sovereign needs 
governmental power to reproduce and maintain the population in its territory. 
Governmental power is linked to the sovereign and disciplinary powers since it retains and 
utilises the techniques and institutions of sovereign and disciplinary powers in its processes 
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by reinscribing and recoding them. This can be seen in how, for example, laws that are 
used by the sovereign power as a judicial tool are in turn used by the governmental power 
as tactics, creating norms.
131
 
 
The dominance of governmental and disciplinary powers had a large impact also on the 
way in which violence was used and perceived in societies. Due to the shift of dominance 
from sovereign to governmental and disciplinary powers and the new forms of governing, 
there was no longer need for torture and violence as means of expressing and enforcing 
sovereign power over population. I will discuss these changes next.  
4.2 Changes in the form of violence 
 
The function and meaning of violence has gone through a radical change in modern 
societies. As can be seen from the changes in the concept of the society and the sovereign, 
violence does not play such a central or visible part in the new modern societies as before. 
Use of violence and torture decreased since the ways of controlling the society underwent 
major changes starting from the early modern period. The new ways of governing gained 
prominence in the way populations were governed and controlled, and this caused a shift 
from the dominance of the sovereign power to the pre-eminence of discipline and 
governmental powers in the modern era. This change affected the decrease in the use of 
violence, such as torture, since violence and coercion were no longer needed to control the 
population. 
 
 However, violence did not disappear from society completely, but it merely changed its 
form. Kahn argues that in modern societies, violence is still a way of recreating and 
reinforcing the sovereign and increasing its power, and that the sovereign power in modern 
society still requires acts of physical sacrifices. However, the violence is not visible 
anymore, as it used to be in public executions and legal institutions, but it is played out in 
acts of war instead. In situations of war, the individuals still have the chance to sacrifice 
their body for the sovereign – an act very similar to torture in previous systems of control. 
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The new form of violence, war, is also publicly presented to the masses as a celebration of 
the force of the sovereign power, for example in a form or war propaganda.
132
 
 
Changes in the notion of violence are closely attached to the changes in how the judicial 
system is perceived in modern societies
133. As Kahn argues, we live in a society of “noble 
lie”134 where the legal system has replaced the violence practiced by the sovereign. This 
means that the judicial system including, for example, the courts and judges have absorbed 
the sovereign violence making it invisible.
135
 In modern societies there isn’t any individual 
sovereign authority that would enforce his will upon its subjects by means of violence, but 
rather a complicated juridical system of legal experts who process cases in an anonymous 
fashion making the use of violence invisible.  On example of this can be seen in how, in 
some countries, there is a uniform dress code for all the judges, which is used to further 
obscure the fact that all judges are actually private individuals similarly enhancing their 
role as faceless and nameless servants of state justice.  
 
The use of violence was also largely affected by the new human rights discourses, which 
presented individuals as possessors of rights and which gave them protection against the 
violence practiced by the state. Human rights had also other functions in the society since 
they can also be used by the state and ruling powers. I will discuss these multiple roles of 
human rights in the new forms of governing in the next chapter. 
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5. Human rights in the new system of control  
 
The reason why I have chosen human rights as a particular point of interest is that they 
play many roles in the control and governing of people in the societies. At the level of 
international law, human rights can be seen as an instance which limits the power of the 
sovereign states (imposes rules on how states should conduct themselves vis-à-vis their 
nationals), but when looked from a sociological perspective, the role of human rights is 
much more complex: they act as a part of new forms of governing as a normalising and 
also division-creating instance, but also, as a foundation and justification for the sovereign 
power. Thus human rights can be argued to be both, a mechanism limiting the sovereign 
power, but on the other hand they can also be used to enforce and express the sovereign 
power, and they can also be used as means of control. 
 
In this chapter, my aim is to start to analyse these myriad roles of human rights. In this 
chapter I will focus on the role of the human rights in controlling the population as a part 
of new forms of governing in general, national level, and as a justification for the existence 
of sovereign power. I will start by introducing some ideas of Foucault about law in general 
and then analyse, how the human rights work as a part of the new ways of governing. Then 
I will discuss how the human rights function as a justification for the sovereign power. In 
the next section, I will develop this analysis further and see in a particular case of the 
torture by the United States  in its war on terror, how these functions relate to torture and 
how they can be used by the sovereign power in the international level. 
 
 
5.1 Human rights as a part of the new forms of governing   
 
I will start this analysis by discussing the general notions of law presented by Foucault. 
Foucault discusses the notion of law in his writings, even though it is not his main focus. 
First of all, law can be seen to function as a tool of sovereign power, and as an instance 
communicating the sovereign will to the people and ensuring that the will of the sovereign 
power is obeyed
136
. Law can also be used by the governmental power as tactics, 
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constituting one set of norms that function as a normalizing instance. It is similar to other 
norm structures, such as social norms and culture, which aim to define the limits and ways 
of desirable, “normal” behaviour. Law is a very strong normalising system since it 
concretely communicates to people which acts are allowed and forbidden. In this sense, 
law has two kinds of roles in the society: on one hand, it defines concretely the acts that are 
allowed and forbidden, and describes a punishment for the breach of its rules. On the other 
hand, law also acts as a norm itself.
137
 
 
In the modern societies, the control of populations turned to its mirror image from what it 
had been: instead of the sovereign power threatening to end the life of the subjects, the 
governmental power started to concentrate on controlling birth and the maintenance of 
life.
138
 Emergence of the human rights can be seen to form a part of this turn of events – 
law became also a set of norms giving rights to the people – not only dictating the will of 
the sovereign to the masses. At the same time, human rights norms, amongst with other 
laws, would act as a normalising instance and as a part of the new forms of governing 
within the societies
139
.  
 
There are also several other theorists, who have discussed the role of human rights as a 
normalising system of control in the modern societies. For example, Bal Sokhi-Bulley uses 
the example of the European Union’s institution for human right protection, the 
Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) to demonstrate how the new forms of governing are 
present in the human rights system. FRA has a website where it distributes information 
about human rights, and encourages people to participate by offering a survey, where 
people can answer to questions about the state of their human rights.
140
 Sokhi-Bulley 
argues, that while doing this people are forced to speak in the language of human rights 
and position themselves in the terms of human rights: to assess whether the rights they are 
entitled to are being fulfilled or not. The system also collects statistics about the realization 
of these rights and informs it back to the people, inviting them again to participate and 
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evaluate themselves on the basis of these findings.
141
 Emily Brown continues to analyse 
this idea by illustrating this mechanism of division and constraint of human rights, by 
referring to a plastic cage. This idea symbolises how human rights discourses at the same 
time control, isolate and recreate the group of people it aims to protect: it creates groups of 
people whose rights are fulfilled (the state that everyone should aim for), and to people, 
who’s rights are not (and who should therefore take active measures to reach the state 
where they can enjoy full rights).
142
 Another comparison could be made to a mimic’s box – 
in this idea, there is no cage or any outer restraint that would control or contain people, but 
the people themselves internalise the constraints and become trapped in the invisible box 
of the rights discourses.  
 
The human rights system can therefore be seen to form a part of the new system of 
governing, since it creates norms for which the people should aim for, and grades and 
qualifies people on this basis. This is one example of governing of populations by the new 
forms of governing, which has moved from the use of violence and coercion into utilising 
the will of the people to protect themselves, and to using invisible enforcing mechanisms 
and norms to reach these goals. This example of the human rights can also be used to 
demonstrate how the laws used by the sovereign power, can be instead used as tactics by 
acting as norms, by the governmental power. 
 
Human rights have also other functions in the modern society besides forming part of the 
new forms of governing: They have a special relation to sovereign power in a way that 
they can function also as a justification for it. I will discuss this role of human rights next. 
 
5.2 Human rights as justification for the sovereign  
 
Even though the dominance of the sovereign power decreased due to strengthening of 
governmental power and new forms of governing, such as human rights, taking place, the 
sovereign power did not disappear. Human rights are also closely related to sovereign 
power, since they can also be seen to provide a justification for the existence of the 
sovereign power, and thus as a mechanism of enforcing and recreating its power. This is 
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possible, since human rights are closely connected to state and nationality. The rights are 
guaranteed and given by the state to its citizens (or people under its jurisdiction). This 
close linkage between the nationality and human rights can be seen already at the birth of 
human rights. The ideas of human rights and the nation states were born at the same time: 
The rights resided in the state and on the other hand, the state was seen to exist for 
protection of the rights of individuals.
143
 This led to the birth of the trinity of sovereignty: 
sovereign man, sovereign people and sovereign state. This meant that the protection of the 
sovereign man’s right was the justification for sovereign (nation) state, which in turn 
became articulated through the will of sovereign people.
 144
 This signifies that in a modern 
society, the sovereign can be seen to have acquired its entitlement to rule from the idea of 
human rights.
145
 Thus by upholding and protecting these rights the sovereign is actually 
reinstating and recreating its power. In a very similar manner that the ruler was seen to 
have gotten his powers from the God, in modern societies the rulers can be seen to acquire 
their powers from the “superior” or “sacred” norms of human rights. 
 
 This interconnectedness of human rights and state institution meant that citizenship 
became the defining element of who is entitled to rights and who is not. The citizens were 
protected by the sovereign, and at the same time, division was made to aliens who were 
excluded from the field of human rights. The existence of this exclusion was also vital for 
the existence of a state because the basis of a nation state – the national identity – depends 
on the division between the different nationalities. Therefore, in order to define a state and 
nation, a division had to be made between the citizens and the others, aliens, who were not 
entitled to rights provided by the state. 
146
 
 
From this section, it can be seen that human rights play multiple roles in society, and they 
are in many ways closely connected to the sovereign power. On one hand, they act as a 
normalising instance and part of new ways of governing, but on the other hand they are 
also vital for the existence of the sovereign, since they act as a justification for sovereign 
power. In this sense human rights act in a very similar manner than torture in the pre-
modern societies: torture was used before to articulate and uphold sovereign power, and it 
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was often used as well to create divisions between foreigners or second-class citizens, who 
could be tortured. Human rights fill the same functions, but it opposite way – it is used as a 
positive enforcement, a carrot towards which people should aim for, and not a stick forcing 
them to obey. It also defines the limits of who is a member of the society (who is entitled 
to rights), and who is not. It also is a foundation for sovereign power, in a sense that it 
legitimises its existence.   
 
The twofold nature of human rights as both a way of limiting, but on the other hand 
enforcing and justifying sovereign power can be seen as one reason why the use of torture 
did not completely disappear in modern societies. I will next turn to analyse this in greater 
detail. I will use the example of torture by the United Sates in its war on terror as an 
example of this re-emergence of torture and see what it reveals about these different 
powers in the society and how human rights are used by the sovereign power in this 
particular case, at national and also at international levels.  
60 
 
 IV Re-emerging torture  
 
In the two previous sections I have aimed to answer the first question of how the use of 
torture changed from a common legal practice to an act prohibited by international law, by 
analysing the use of torture as an unequal act and an expression and a way to increase the 
power of sovereign power, and its decrease as a result of the emergence of new ways of 
governing and the shift of the dominant force in the society from sovereign to 
governmental and disciplinary powers – a process in which the human rights have had a 
significant role as a part of new forms of governing and also as a justification of sovereign 
power. These changes led into situation, where populations could be controlled in more 
refined mechanisms, so that direct use of violence in the form of torture was no longer 
necessary.  
 
In this section I turn to analyse the second question of why United States, a modern, 
western state that advocates human rights, has used torture in the 21
st
 century despite this 
being prohibited by international law as presented in previous part of this thesis. I have 
taken this use of torture by the United States as an example, since the United States has had 
an active role in advocating the human rights and prohibition of torture at international and 
national levels, while still committing torture itself. I believe that due to these factors, this 
example illustrates well how the sovereign and governmental powers function in the 
society and how the human rights discourses can be used by the sovereign power to 
advance its own interest and control populations. 
 
In this section I will first discuss the role of the three different powers (sovereign, 
discipline and governmental power) in the use of torture by the United States in its war on 
terror and analyse, what does this particular case of the use of torture tell about the 
relationship between these powers. Then I will analyse how human rights relate to these 
changes in these power relations at national and international levels. 
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6. Torture and the war on terror in the 21
st
 century 
 
I will start by analysing the reasons for the increase of the use of torture by using the 
different concepts of power, presented by Foucault. In previous chapters, I presented how 
the new forms of governing have gained prominence in modern society, shifting the way of 
control from violence to more subtle methods. This shift signified also a change in the 
dominant form of power from sovereign to governmental power. The emergence of torture 
in the 21
st
 century United States can be seen as an event signalling the increase of the 
power of the sovereign power, which has been able to gain prominence by using new 
different mechanisms, such as mechanisms of security.  
 
In this chapter, I will first present the concept of mechanisms of security in greater detail, 
and analyse their role in governing people in modern societies. Next, I will turn to analyse 
the role of these mechanisms in relation to the sovereign power, and discuss, how the use 
of these mechanisms has made it possible for the sovereign power to increase its powers 
and disregard the laws prohibiting torture. 
 
6.1 Mechanisms of security 
 
I will start by presenting the functions of mechanisms of security. According to Foucault, 
sovereign, disciplinary and governmental power function using different mechanisms. One 
important part of these mechanisms is a notion called technologies, apparatuses or 
mechanisms of security. These mechanisms are different systems and institutions that 
function in the society, such as different institutions that care and maintain the health and 
well-being of people. The reason why these mechanisms are needed is that they are used to 
protect the society from different types of threats. The idea of constant threats endangering 
the existence of people in the society is based in the idea that the population is seen as an 
entity, the biological existence of which is being constantly threatened.
147
 The mechanisms 
of security aim to protect the population form these threats. 
148
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The need for mechanisms of security is based on the connectivity between security, fear 
and freedom – all of which are essential characteristics of the liberal society: In the modern 
societies, the new forms of government have replaced external regulation and coercion by 
focusing on internal production and supervision and they are using freedoms as an 
instrument of this process.
149
 In this process, freedoms are no longer only a negative right 
from oppression, but they have become positive actions of a state. The change in the nature 
of freedom is similar to the changes in human rights discourses, where focus has turned 
from guaranteeing freedom from state oppression to guaranteeing different positive 
rights.
150
 The need for positive actions to guarantee freedom can be seen, for example, in 
the paradox of free trade: in order for there to be free trade, a control system has to exist to 
prevent monopolies. In other words, definitive acts are needed in order to create and secure 
freedoms. In liberal society, different threats, such as poverty and unemployment, are 
present all the time. Different mechanisms of security are in place to secure the liberal 
freedom and protect it from these threats.
151
 Due to this, mechanisms of security are also 
closely connected to human rights discourses, since human rights can be seen as a 
guarantee and protector for the most fundamental rights and freedoms. 
 
Mechanisms of security do not only protect the population from different threats, but in 
fact, the relationship between mechanisms of security and threats it deters, is reciprocal. 
This means that mechanisms of security need threats to exist and therefore in a way, the 
mechanisms of security nurtures and creates these threats.
152
 The mechanisms are 
dependant on the threats, since the function of mechanisms of security is based on fear. 
Fear is also central to the whole notion of the new forms of governing, since fear itself is 
the basis for rational self in the Foucauldian sense. Fear motivates people to self-control: 
for example, fear of illnesses motivates to exercise and fear of poverty or unemployment 
motivates to educate oneself. The fear can be therefore seen as a sort of driving force 
behind the modern society and ways of controlling population.
153
 The mechanisms of 
security work and gain power by using this fear and constantly creating new threats using 
discourses. Discourse analysis is based on an idea that the reality is constructed in 
communication and discourses, and the way discourse is used can shape our concept of the 
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reality. Discourse is therefore not a neutral event, where information is changed between 
parties, but an event, where power and techniques of persuasion and manipulation are 
present
154
. This constant creation of new threats is vital for the survival of the mechanisms 
of security. The so-called ‘critical security studies’ argue that in these types of processes, 
individual interests of the rulers are made into interests of nations, and the world is seen in 
the framework of threats. In these processes actions are driven by the fear, created and 
maintained by mechanisms of security.
155
 
 
One way of explaining the increased use of torture can be seen in the increase in these 
mechanisms of security. It has been argued, that modern era is the era of societies of 
security.
156
 In this era, security is seen as a super-power that tramps all other rights, and the 
whole world is viewed through a “security lens”.157  Security can also been seen as having 
formed a “super-right”, that tramps all other rights and gives justification for the state to 
intervene to people’s private sphere and disregard their other rights (such as right to 
privacy). 
158
In this type of societies, to return to the theory of Foucault about discipline and 
state power, the legal field and disciplinary powers are taken over by mechanisms of 
security. These mechanisms create an authority beyond law and are not subject to its rules. 
159
 
 
A similar turn of events can be seen to have taken place in the post 9/11 United States. 
This was a start of a new era of security, where other rights were tramped over by the need 
for security. New laws were enacted, allowing ever increasing amounts of power to 
systems advancing security, and to the head of the state.
160
 This increase of power of the 
mechanisms of security led to the use of torture in the war on terror, since it made ignoring 
the previously binding legal rules (such as norms of human rights) possible. 
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Even though mechanisms of security can be seen to form means of using torture by 
bypassing the laws prohibiting it, they do not provide answer to the question why this took 
place. Next, I will turn to analyse this question by concentrating on forces and powers 
behind these mechanisms, using the previous concepts of governmental, sovereign and 
disciplinary powers. 
 
6.2 The rogue sovereign 
 
As can be seen, the increased power of mechanisms of security has enabled the use of 
torture in the 21
st
 century United States. According to Foucault, mechanisms of security do 
not function on their own, but they are moreover used as mechanisms of control by the 
different powers in society. Therefore the re-emergence of torture can be seen as 
presenting a change of the dominant power in the society: as discussed in previous 
chapters, in modern societies the dominant power is the governmental power, but in the 
post 9/11 United States, it can be seen that the sovereign power has again gained more 
prominence, using the mechanisms of security to enforce its power. This idea has also been 
presented by Judith Butler, who uses the term “rogue sovereign” to describe these new 
sovereign forces based on security, which have taken over in the society. Butler argues that 
in a normal state of events, the sovereign power gives different methods of 
governmentality space to function.
161
 However, in emergency conditions, the laws and the 
legal system is superseded by new re-emerging form of sovereign
162
. The new sovereign is 
considered as rogue, since it neutralizes the rule of law in the name of security.
163
 This can 
be seen to have taken place by using the mechanisms of security as described above.  
 
This process of emerging new sovereign power illustrates the argument, that law is based 
on the sovereign power, but the sovereign is based exclusively on itself.
164
 The new form 
of sovereign is not lawful - it is independent of all legal rules, and this is the factor that 
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differentiates the rogue sovereign from the previous forms of sovereignty.
165
 This can be 
particularly well illustrated by analysing the statement of Rumsfeld during the torture 
scandal: He stated in several occasions that he is not a lawyer, when he was questioned 
about the legality of the acts of officers of the United States, who were accused of torturing 
prisoners suspected to be terrorists. In this statement, the law can be seen as merely a tool 
that is not relevant to the events taking place in actual reality: the question of legality 
should be left to the lawyers, who can twist and turn the legal language so that the events 
that have taken place will fit the international legal norms.
166
 
 
Even though the sovereign power has gained more prominence, the other types of power 
have not disappeared, but they still function at the same time: The new sovereign power 
works within the field of governmentality, and is dependant on its structures. Butler 
illustrates this by using the example of soldiers who act in places, such as Guantanamo, as 
a type of “petty sovereigns” – individuals that can roam free and are not accountable to law 
and can make decisions such as limiting other people’s freedom by indefinite detention or 
using torture, without any legal authority to do so. These acts are made possible by the 
existing governmental structures, where administrative procedures have replaced the 
judicial ones.
167
 
  
The increased prominence of the sovereign power can be analysed also by focusing on the 
changes in the concept of violence. As discussed in previous chapters, on one hand, 
violence in societies has become absorbed in the judicial system, where it has become 
invisible. On the other hand, acts of visible violence and physical sacrifices for the 
sovereign power are still present in the situations of war. These two factors can be seen to 
be present in the war on terror as well. One distinct factor is that the United States has 
already titled these events as “war”, thus something that is a celebration of the sovereign 
power, and at the same time it is enforcing the distinction to “us” and “them”. On this war, 
however, the violence is often obscured – it is performed by state officials abroad, most 
often in secrecy of the detention centres. This again resembles the use of torture in the 
medieval times, where trials could be held in secrecy – this made it easier for the state to 
construct the enemy and act as the supreme power giving out its verdict without fear of 
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being challenged by the accused. Torture in the war on terror is also practiced against 
foreigners – another common feature with the torture in the medieval times. By following 
the idea of Kahn, in modern era, it can be said that the sovereign reinstates its power 
through the war on terror, and sacrifices it demands are the ones of the detained 
foreigners.
168
 
 
In this chapter I have analysed the way in which sovereign power has gained more 
influence by using the mechanisms of security. This has enabled it to disregard the national 
laws, including ones based on international human rights norms. I will now continue this 
analysis by looking at how the sovereign power can also use the human rights discourses to 
its own advantage at the international level.  
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7. Human rights and torture at the international level 
 
As can be seen in the previous chapters, human rights are very closely connected to ideas 
of state and nationality, and also to sovereign and governmental powers – they function as 
a part of new system of government but also offer justification for the existence of the 
sovereign power. In previous chapters I have discussed these functions of human rights, 
concentrating mainly on their role in controlling and governing the population within 
societies.
169
 I will now turn back to look at the other role of human rights, as a force 
limiting the power of the sovereign power, and analysing how the sovereign power reacts 
to  and uses human rights at the international level. 
 
As has already been discussed in the analysis of the human rights as a part of the new 
forms of governing, they functions also as a divisive element, defining who is a national 
and entitled to rights, and who is not
170
. This way of creating divisions can also be seen to 
have taken place in a wider framework:  since human rights are by definition rights for all 
who are human, it can be adversely concluded, that those who don’t have these rights, are 
not, ipso facto, human. Therefore human rights can be seen to entail one type of definition 
in of who is considered as human. This adverse discourse can be used also at the 
international level to divide people into humans (“us”, who are entitled to protection of 
rights) and non-humans (“them”, people without protection) – in a very similar manner that 
they are used at the national level to define boarders between who is a national of a state 
and who is not
171
. This has been illustrated by Douzinas, who has argued, that at the 
international level, the human right discourse creates different groups of humanity: super-
humans, who are western and whose rights are fulfilled, and on the other end of the 
spectrum, the non-human, persons without protection, such as refugees or people in 
concentration camps.
172
This type of human rights discourses have been prominent in the 
statements made by the United States in war on terror: The terrorists are described as 
dangerous animal-like killing machines, which need to be contained in order to stop them 
from destroying the free democratic societies. These people are seen to be so far from the 
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western culture and values that they cannot be reasoned with: all they understand is 
violence and coercion, and thus torture is necessary in order to keep them in control. 
173
 
 
United States has been aiming to present all the detainees in detention centres as dangerous 
terrorists and moreover, it has created an opposite for western culture: Islam. Islam and 
Muslims are perceived as the others: dangerous and unknown. This discourse can be 
argued to be used to obscure the political meaning and aims behind the individual terror 
acts. 
174
 This can be seen in how (at least in public), the United States has not devoted great 
energy to analysing the question ‘why do terrorists attack?’, since this question is already 
answered in the definition of terrorists itself – because they are terrorists, a group of 
irrational non-political beings that try to destroy the western democratic, liberal societies - 
because “that’s what terrorists do”. This act of denial of politics furthermore highlights the 
differences between “us” (rational, political beings) and terrorists (beings that don’t act on 
political, rational motives but are inherently different). 
 
Elan Abrell argues, that using these processes, the United States is trying to create a new 
absolute enemy and monopolize the human rights to the western culture. One part of this 
process is using the security discourses at the international level. This process is very 
similar to the function of mechanisms of security at the national level, and it is done by 
posing security and freedom of the West as “super-rights” that justifies tramping rights of 
other people. In this process, freedom and human rights become considered as the 
monopoly of the western world, and their need for protection overrides other people’s 
rights (or in other words, these people are not granted human rights in the first place).
 175
 
 
From this analysis it can be concluded, that very similar mechanisms are in place at 
national and international levels. As discussed before, mechanisms of security and rogue 
sovereign have been able to tramp the human rights norms and other laws and gain more 
power in the post 9/11 United States. At the international level these mechanisms actually 
act in a similar manner to the governmental power:  the United States has not been able to 
alter these internationally binding legal norms, but instead it uses them as tactics to control 
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and enhance its own power by creating divisions and giving new definitions to these 
recognised norms. It has done this by trying to re-define the meaning of human rights (so 
that the term “human” applies mainly to citizens of western societies), and it has also 
enforced this definition by using torture and thus excluding in practice some people from 
this scope of protection of human rights. Thus here two parallel functions can be seen: on 
one hand the security discourses have superseded legal ones at domestic level, and 
simultaneously at the international level, where legal norms are stronger, they are used in a 
manner of tactics. These both processes enforce the power of the (rogue) sovereign, and 
are enacted and reinforced in practice by using torture on the detainees that the United 
States has captured in events it has titled as war on terror. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this thesis I have used legal and sociological approaches to analyse and to provide 
answers to two linked questions concerning the use of torture: Why the use of torture 
changed from a common legal practice to an act prohibited by international law, and why 
the United States, a modern, western state that advocates human rights, has used torture in 
the 21
st
 century despite this?  
 
In the first part of this thesis I approached these questions from legal perspective. I began 
by presenting how torture was first used in Europe in ordeals and then in systems of 
standard of proof, and how its use diminished from the early modern period onwards due 
to changes in the judicial systems and especially due to the emergence of human rights 
norms. Then I discussed the current position of torture as an act prohibited by international 
law and norms of jus cogens. I also analysed the definition of torture in different 
conventions and presented the constitutive elements of torture in international law, and 
how the interpretation of this definition has changed. Lastly, I presented how torture has 
been used by the United States in its war on terror and how the United States has aimed to 
justify its use by altering the definition of torture, or claiming that the human rights norms 
don’t apply to terrorists. 
 
In the second part of this thesis I used a sociological approach and discussed the change in 
the use of torture in the context of changes in the three powers (sovereign, governmental 
and disciplinary power) present in societies, and concentrated especially on their relation to 
human rights. I started the analysis by looking at torture as an unequal act: one definition 
of torture in international law is that it should be performed by someone of an official 
capacity, and this signals that torture is closely connected to state power – it is violence 
legitimised by the state, or performed by the state. This also renders torture essentially an 
unequal act of non-reciprocal violence exercised by a person in a superior power position 
in relation to other.  Due to this unequal nature, the use of torture in the medieval times can 
be seen as a way in which the sovereign power is presenting itself and enforcing its power 
in the society.  Following from this analysis, it can be argued that the need for torture 
diminished after the enlightenment due to the development of the new forms of governing 
and control, which no longer needed physical coercion and violence. Human rights 
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discourses were also an important factor in this mode of governing, acting as a 
normalising, and division-creating instance and providing justification of sovereign power. 
When comparing the methods of control, the human rights discourses can be seen to have 
taken place of the use of torture in the modern societies, since its functions (to control and 
govern the population and enforce the sovereign power) are similar to those achieved via 
torture in medieval societies. This reflects the change of forms of governing people to its 
mirror image from medieval to modern times – people are controlled by methods 
resembling positive enforcement instead of negative threats.  
 
As an answer to the second question concerning the case of the United States, I used these 
same concepts of powers and mechanisms of control to explain the emergence of the use of 
torture by re-emergence of a new type of rogue sovereign power. This power uses security 
discourses and mechanisms of security to increase its power, making it possible for it to 
function behind the law. This new sovereign has emerged from the field of 
governmentality and one of its incarnations can be seen to be the petty sovereigns, 
individuals that can act behind the judicial framework, using power in administrative 
structures. The human rights discourses are also used in these processes at the international 
level as a division-creating instance aiming to hegemonize and control the human rights 
discourses, monopolising them to the western states. In this process, human rights function 
in a similar manner at the international level, as they do as part of tactics used by 
governmental forces at the national level. 
 
In conclusion, it can be seen that the use of torture has undergone a drastic change from 
being an institutional legal practice to an act prohibited by international law, but the use of 
which has still in practice re-emerged. These changes can be explained from the judicial 
viewpoint, by the changes in the judicial systems and the increased influence of the human 
rights norms. They can also be explained using sociological view and concentrating on the 
changes in the different ruling powers in the society: in this analysis, reasons for the 
changes can be found in first, the decreased influence of sovereign power and dominance 
of disciplinary and governmental powers, and then the re-emergence of the sovereign 
power and its use of security discourses and mechanisms to regain its powers. Human 
rights have played part in both of these processes by being part of new forms of governing 
and also as a justification for the sovereign power at the national level, and also by being a 
restrictive judicial element but also being used as tactics by the sovereign power at the 
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international level. This twofold sociological and legal analysis reveals the dual character 
of the human rights: they can be an emancipatory legal tool giving rights to people and 
limiting sovereign power, but at the same time they can also be used to enforce and justify 
this power and function as its means of control at both national and international levels.  
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